Static inefficiency of compulsory licensing: Quantity vs. price competition. by Cugno, Franco & Ottoz, Elisabetta
 
Dipartimento di Politiche Pubbliche e Scelte Collettive – POLIS 





















Static inefficiency of compulsory licensing: 
Quantity vs. price competition 
 



















UNIVERSITA’ DEL PIEMONTE ORIENTALE “Amedeo Avogadro”  ALESSANDRIA 
 
Periodico mensile on-line "POLIS Working Papers" - Iscrizione n.591 del 12/05/2006 - Tribunale di Alessandria  
Static Inefficiency of Compulsory Licensing: 
Quantity vs. Price Competition  
 
 
FRANCO CUGNO, ELISABETTA OTTOZ 
 
Department of Economics, University of Turin 







A common argument against compulsory licensing of intellectual property maintains that it 
facilitates the entry of inefficient producers, which may reduce social welfare independently of any 
effects on R&D incentives. We study the issue in a model where the innovative firm, under the 
threat of compulsory licensing, react strategically by choosing between quantity and price 
competition. We show that the risk of a reduction in static welfare due to the entry of highly 
inefficient firms is avoided if licensing entails a royalty per unit of output and zero fixed fee. The 
rationale behind this result lies in the fact that compulsory licensing threat works as a disciplining 
device to improve static social welfare, even when the applicant is a high cost inefficient firm. 
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The essential facilities doctrine, within the antitrust law, specifies when the owner of an 
input or factor of production should be mandated to provide access to it at a reasonable 
price. Broadly speaking, an input is regarded as essential when it is under the control of a 
monopolist who denies access to a downstream competitor, in a context characterized by 
the absence of economically viable alternatives, and the market at issue is important for 
social welfare (Aoki and Small, 2004). As such, the essential facilities doctrine applies 
directly to the intellectual property, where an obligation to make property available is 
equivalent to a requirement for compulsory licensing. On the other hand, intellectual 
property rights are granted in order to promote innovation by conferring the innovator an 
exclusive right to exclude others from making, using or selling a protected innovation. 
So, it seems that there is an obvious conflict between the two body of intellectual 
property and antitrust law, especially when the innovations are drastic.
1 As Gilbert and 
Shapiro (1996) point out, although in the long run intellectual property rights may favor 
competition by granting the innovators to be rewarded for their innovative efforts, in 
practice great tensions arise between intellectual property and antitrust law due to the 
elusiveness of the long run outcomes. 
The trade off between short run social welfare, which may be enhanced by 
compulsory licensing, and long run welfare, whose level may depend on the strength of 
intellectual property rights, has been widely discussed in the economics on optimal 
                                                 
1 An innovation is “drastic” if its pricing is not affected by the threat of competition, that is the 
innovator can behave as an unrestricted monopolist (Arrow, 1962). patents.
2 But, leaving aside the dynamic efficiency problem connected with innovation 
incentives, there is another critical point which has been less studied. This point, raised 
by Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Gilbert and Shapiro (1996), questions the widespread 
opinion that licensing always improves welfare in the short run, i.e., that licensing is 
always efficient from a static point of view. In a duopoly context, the authors found that 
in some cases static welfare is strictly lowered by licensing. In particular, under Cournot 
competition this may occur if the entrant firm produces at rather high costs relative to the 
innovator’s ones, although it has access to the innovation.
3 Thus, compulsory licensing 
may reduce economic efficiency in the short run by facilitating the entry of inefficient 
producers that partially crowd out the innovators’ output. According to the authors, to set 
the licensing fee is a difficult task for the antitrust agency, as a high licensing fee might 
keep out firms whose entrance may be efficient, whereas a low fee might worsen short 
run efficiency. 
Bearing in mind the above risks of compulsory licensing, the aim of this paper is to 
analyze the role that may be played by the threat of compulsory licensing in conditioning 
patent holder’s strategic choices, and the consequences of these choices on static welfare. 
We present a very simple model where the players are the patent holder of a drastic 
innovation and a potential licensee with higher post-licensing production costs, 
competing à la Cournot if licensing occurs. But compulsory licensing may not actually 
occur in our framework. When threatened by a mandate to license, the patent holder, 
whose preferred choice lies in the monopolistic exploitation of the patent, compares the 
profit under Cournot competition with the profit obtainable applying a lower price by 
which the prospective entrant would be deterred. If the limit-pricing strategy turns out to 
be dominant, the potential licensee will be dissuaded from applying for a license. 
                                                 
2 One strand of this literature reaches the conclusion that compulsory licensing at low price 
associated with a long life for patent is socially optimal (Tandon, 1982;  Gilbert and Shapiro, 
1990; Denicolò, 1996). 
3 Not directly related to licensing, but similar in spirit is the conclusion of Lahiri and Ono (1988), 
according to which by eliminating or impairing minor firms a government can actually increase 
welfare. We find that a decrease in static social welfare, in consequence of an inefficient firm 
being granted a license, can be avoided if licensing envisages a royalty per unit output 
and no fixed fee. In such circumstances, when the entrant’s production costs are 
sufficiently high to worsen social welfare if entry actually occurs, the patent holder 
prefers a limit-pricing strategy. On the contrary, compulsory licensing is the preferred 
choice when the potential licensee present a small cost disadvantage with the patent 
holder, as in that case an exclusionary strategy would be too expensive. But if the cost 
differential is small, entry increases social welfare. In conclusion, under pure royalty 
arrangement compulsory licensing threat might work as a disciplining device to improve 
short term social welfare. 
This outcome is not entirely confirmed under fixed-fee licensing. We show that in 
this case the threat of compulsory licensing improves static welfare, whatever the cost 
differential, if the fixed fee is set at a sufficiently low level. But, more generally, there 
exists a constellation of parameters (fixed fee and cost differential) where the contrary 
happens. This is due to the fact that the limit-pricing strategy is less attractive under 
fixed-fee than under royalty licensing.
4 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is presented and the results 
are drawn. Section 3 is dedicated to some remarks and extensions, and Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. COMPULSORY LICENSING WITH INEFFICIENT ENTRANTS 
 
Let us consider a market in which operates a patent holder, called firm 1, that manages a 
proprietary technology implying marginal production costs  0 1 = m .  There is only one 
potential entrant, labelled firm 2, whose production costs are 
M p m ≥ 2  when the access 
to the patented technology is denied, where 
M p  is the monopolistic price, and 
                                                 
4 In a different context, Aoki and Small (2004) assert the superiority of compulsory licensing 
through a royalty with respect to fixed fee licensing. = 2 m ρ + ε ,  , 0 , 0 ≥ ρ ≥ ε  
M p < ρ + ε , when the access is permitted at a royalty per unit 
output  ρ. Since in the absence of licensing 
M p m ≥ 2 , i.e. the patented technology is a 
drastic innovation, voluntary licensing does not occur. On the other hand, firm 1 
technology can be viewed as an essential facility: this leaves room for an antitrust 
intervention, that is for compulsory licensing. However, as Gilbert and Shapiro (1996) 
point out, compulsory licensing may not improve social welfare even in the short run. 
 
2.1. COMPULSORY LICENSING UNDER COURNOT COMPETITION 
 
To expound the arguments, we begin with the following proposition which extends to the 
case of licensing a well known result in the oligopoly theory (Lahiri and Ono, 1988). 
 
Proposition 1. Consider a patent holder (firm 1) and a licensee (firm 2) competing à la 
Cournot in a homogeneous product market with inverse demand  X p − α =  and constant 
but differentiated marginal costs  0 1 = m  and  ρ + ε = 2 m ,  , 0 , 0 ≥ ρ ≥ ε  
2
α
= < ρ + ε
M p , 
where  ρ represents the royalty per unit output. Then, the entry of firm 2 enhances 
welfare if and only if  
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respectively. Then, it is easy to see that the entry of firm 2 increases social welfare, that is 
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Some tedious calculations show that there are two levels of  ρ + ε  such that  0 = Φ : 
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Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. In the region bounded by oab, where 
2
2ρ − α
< ε , firm 2 applies for a license, because in this region  0
9
)] ( 2 [
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2 5 ρ − α ρ + α
< ε < .
5 Thus, since production costs of the potential entrant are hardly 
observed by the antitrust agency and the entrant has the incentives to declare low costs to 
obtain a license, compulsory licensing may be socially worsening. 
 
2.2. COMPULSORY LICENSING UNDER LIMIT PRICING AND PURE ROYALTY ARRANGEMENT 
 
                                                 
5 Proposition 1 parallels the result of Lahiri and Ono (1988) according to which by eliminating 
minor (inefficient) firms a government can actually enhance social welfare. This occurs because 
elimination of an inefficient firm shifts production from it to more efficient ones, so that total 
industry profits increase. Under certain circumstances, the increase in profits dominates the loss in 
consumer’s surplus due to reduction in competition. The above conclusion ignores a possibility, i.e. that when the cost differential is positive 
the profits of firm 1 may be greater under price than under quantity competition.
6 
Suppose that, although the antitrust agency does not foresee production costs of the 
potential entrant, these costs are known by firm 1.
7 Moreover, suppose that a post-
licensing strategy adopted by firm 1 in order to drive out the licensee would be 
interpreted as a predatory behaviour by the antitrust authority, while a limit-pricing 
strategy adopted before firm 2 becomes a licensee does not.
8 In this case, under the threat 
of compulsory licensing a pre-licensing limit-pricing strategy can be superior to Cournot 
competition for firm 1. In particular, when production cost of the potential entrant are 
sufficiently high, instead of passively accepting the antitrust decision and then engaging 




Proposition 2. Suppose firm 1 is threatened by compulsory licensing at a royalty per unit 
output ρ. Then, for 




2 ρ − α
< ε <
ρ − α
                   (2) 
 
the dominant strategy for firm 1 is the limit-pricing strategy. 
 
                                                 
6 This point has been raised by Zanchettin (2003) in a differentiated duopoly context. 
7 The assumption that post-licensing production costs of firm 2 are foreseen by firm 1 even in the 
asymmetric case is usual in the literature on voluntary licensing (see, for instance, Katz and 
Shapiro, 1985). 
8 Under our assumption the term “predatory pricing” refers to a wider range of situations than in 
the standard legal doctrine and economic models, as it does not imply that in order to drive out 
rivals active in the market a firm sets the price below its own cost. On this point, see Edlin (2002) 
and Subsection 3.2  below in this paper. 
9 We first study the consequences of limit pricing under pure royalty licensing. Successively, we 
will consider the case of a pure fixed fee arrangement. Proof. The limit price is  ρ + ε =
L p . If  
L p p =  firm 1 profits amount to 
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On the other hand, if firm 1 accepts the entry of firm 2 by compulsory licensing, its 
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There are two levels of  ρ + ε  such that  0 = Ψ : 
5
3ρ + α
= ρ + ε  and 
2
α
= ρ + ε . Since for 
0 = ρ + ε  the quantity Ψ  is negative, in the range 
2 5
3 α ρ + α
≤ ρ + ε ≤ , that is if condition 
(2) holds, we have  0 ≥ Ψ . In this range the limit-pricing strategy is optimal for firm 1.■ 
 




because in this case exclusion of firm 2 does not require a too large reduction in price 




M p . What is not so obvious is that the level 
of  ε  above which the limit-pricing strategy becomes optimal is smaller than the level 
above which the entry of firm 2 decreases welfare, i.e. that the following proposition 
holds.  
Proposition 3. Suppose firm 1 is threatened by compulsory licensing at a royalty ρ. 
Then, if firm 1 can choose between quantity and price competition, the threat of 
compulsory licensing increases social welfare for any significant combination of 
parameters.  
 
Proof. Recall that under the threat of compulsory licensing the dominant strategy for firm 
1 is the limit-pricing strategy when 
5
2ρ − α
> ε  (Proposition 2), so that in this range 
compulsory licensing does not occur, but output and social welfare increase with respect 
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< ε ≤  the threat of compulsory licensing is surely welfare 
enhancing.■ 
 
Figure 2 illustrates our result. In the region bounded by oadc the entry of firm 2 
increases welfare (see Proposition 1 and Figure 1). In the region bounded by abe , where 
5
2ρ − α
> ε ,  firm 1 prevents entry by setting the output price to a level that renders 
negative the entrant’s earnings (Proposition 2). Thus, in the region oae , included in the 
region oadc, firm 2 enters the market and social welfare increases because the entrant is 
sufficiently efficient, while in the region abe entry does non occur, but compulsory 
licensing constitutes a threat that leads firm 1 to efficiently produce more output, which 
enhances welfare. 
 Figure 2. Outcomes with limit pricing. 
Cournot competition dominates
Welfare increases 




















2.3. PURE FIXED-FEE LICENSING 
 
Suppose now that the antitrust authority mandates access to the patented technology at a 
fixed fee F  and zero royalty. Although a Bain-type model would imply  ε >
L p  in this 
case,
10 in what follows we set  ε =
L p  for two reasons. First, a model where  ε >
L p  rises 
a problem of commitment’s credibility. Since firm 2 would cover its variable costs and 
the antitrust authority would oppose a post-entry pricing strategy by the patent holder 
intended to drive out the newcomer, entry is not completely deterred. In fact, in some 
cases will be in the interest of the incumbent firm to repudiate its commitment, if entry 
actually occurs. Second, the simplification  ε =
L p  does not compromise the essence of 
our arguments. With a limit price greater than ε  the limit-pricing strategy would simply 
become dominant on a wider range of the couple  ) , ( F ε . 
                                                 
10 In a Bain-type model (Bain, 1956) the incumbent commits itself to a certain output level which 
it will maintain in all future periods. If the commitment were credible,  F p
L 2 + ε = . Suppose then that  ε =
L p , so that  ε ε − α = Π ) (
L . The limit-pricing strategy will be 
weakly dominant for firm 1 if  F







D , tat is if 
 










Figure 3 shows the outcomes. In the region bounded by oab firm 2 applies for a 
license, because in this region  F





2 . In the sub-region cbf , where  F > Γ , 
firms 1 adopts a limit-pricing strategy, while in the sub-region oafc  licensing occurs. The 
sub-region oafc  is divided into two zone. In the zone oaedc licensing improves welfare, 
because firm 2 is efficient enough. On the contrary, in the zone def  licensing is welfare 
worsening.  
Summarizing, we can identify three significant intervals for  F . If  ] , 0 [ 1 F F ∈  the 
threat of compulsory licensing is surely welfare improving. In these circumstances, if 
licensing actually occurs it enhances welfare. On the other hand, if licensing were welfare 
worsening because entrant’s production cost are high, the dominant strategy of the 
incumbent firm would be the limit-pricing strategy, which is welfare improving. Instead, 
for any  ) , ( 2 1 F F F ∈  there exists a range of the cost differential ε  in which licensing 
actually occurs and welfare decreases due to the inefficiency of firm 2.
11  Finally, for 
2 F F ≥  the entry of a socially inefficient firm is excluded. Comparing these outcomes 
with those obtained under royalty licensing, where the risk of worsening welfare is 
                                                 
11 Quite surprisingly, low licensing fees ensure the exclusion of socially inefficient firms, whereas 
higher fees do not. The reason for this is that higher fees make the limit pricing strategy less 
advantageous for the patent holder. entirely avoided, it seems clear that royalty licensing could be the preferred choice by the 
antitrust agency in all cases in which this arrangement is feasible.
12 
 
Figure 3. Outcomes with fixed fee. 
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3. REMARKS AND EXTENSIONS 
 
3.1. COORDINATED PRODUCTION 
 
Besides the case of Cournot competition, Gilbert and Shapiro (1996) consider a situation 
where the licensor and the licensee coordinate production in order to maximize joint 
profits. The authors point out that licensing lowers welfare if firm 2’s costs are not too 
high without the license, that is when firms would be reasonably efficient competitors on 
                                                 
12 The reason for the different outcomes is that an increase in ρ enhances the patent-holder profits 
under Cournot competition, but also rises the limit-pricing profits (via the effect on  
L p ), while an 
increase in   F  enhances the patent-holder profits under Cournot competition, but leaves unaltered 
the limit-pricing profits. their own. In this case, private agreements which tend to restrict production are mutually 
convenient, but compulsory licensing can be a further source of inefficiency as firms 2 
could use it as a threat to extract more favorable licensing terms from firm 1. 
If firms have constant marginal costs, coordinated production requires that only the 
more efficient one will produce, while in more general circumstances, with increasing 
marginal costs, both firms will produce at positive levels. In any case, since firm 2 has to 
restrict its output, coordinated production requires some kind of transfer in its favor. For 
example, a licensing agreement envisaging a rather high royalty and a negative fixed fee 
can serve the goal. Thus, negative fixed fees and other forms of side payments should be 
prohibited. 
 
3.2. BELOW-COST PREDATORY PRICING 
 
Recall that our model assumes that the antitrust authority views as predatory any pricing 
strategy intended to drive out a rival active in the market, even when the involved firm is 
pricing above its own cost. It is worth noting that this assumption on the antitrust policy 
is in the spirit of Edlin’s proposed above-cost predatory pricing rule (Edlin, 2002), 
according to which in markets where an incumbent monopoly enjoys significant cost 
advantages over potential entrants, if entry occurs monopoly should be prevented from 
responding with substantial price cuts for a time long enough. The author maintains that 
this rule is a sensible interpretation of section 2 of the Sherman Act and it would give 
monopolies the incentive to price low in the first place, before entry, because under this 
interpretation they are not allowed to drive firms from the market after entry. Since it is 
never clear when an entrant will turn up, the incumbent would have to charge a low price 
all the time. 
Under a more restrictive (and more standard) interpretation of predatory behavior, 
our results change, but only in part. If the incumbent firm can set the price below the rival 
cost both before and after entry without incurring in the risk of a legal suit, it no longer 
has the incentive to price low in the first place, before entry. Thus, the beneficial effect of 
the limit-pricing strategy induced by the threat of compulsory licensing is lost. However, the risk of a reduction in social welfare due to the entry of a highly inefficient firm is 
avoided anyway. When the entrant’s cost is high enough to worsen welfare if entry 
occurs, competing à la Cournot with the entrant is not the preferred choice of the 
incumbent, as setting the price at the level of entrant’s cost is more profitable. 
Anticipating this, the highly inefficient firm will not apply for a license. 
In short, even though Edlin’s predatory pricing rule is socially preferable, a more 
standard rule would not imply the risk that compulsory licensing may reduce social 
welfare in the short run. 
 
3.3. DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY 
 
While the central point of this paper is the static efficiency of compulsory licensing, some 
remarks on the incentives to innovate are in order. As Gilbert and Shapiro (1996) point 
out, compulsory licensing likely reduces the incentives to innovate because it reduces the 
innovator’s expected reward and raises the profits of those firms that do not invest in 
research. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that Gilbert and Shapiro’s argument 
assumes a given patent length, which is natural if compulsory licensing is viewed as an 
exceptional event, but not if the antitrust agency were using it as a more ordinary action. 
In this case it would be absurd to ignore that policymakers can also control patent 
duration, whose lengthening may compensate the negative effects of compulsory 
licensing on patent holder’s earnings. Thus, the problem would turn into the one of 
coordinating patent and antitrust policies: an antitrust policy inclined to mandate access, 
given certain circumstances, to patented technologies should be accompanied by a patent 
regime which guarantees that in those circumstances patent holders enjoy an oligopoly 
market power for a time long enough to cover research costs. In other words, it is a matter 
of optimal patent breadth and length, which is not specific of compulsory licensing.
13 
                                                 
13 For example, patent breadth may depend on the costs of non infringing duplications as in Gallini 
(1990) and Maurer and Scotchmer (2002), or on uncertainty and delay in patent litigation, as in 
Ayres and Klemperer (1999). Obviously, the effects on social welfare would remain to be seen. Actually, the 
literature on optimal patents and recent findings on the so-called “ratio test” (Shapiro, 
2006a, 2006b; Denicolò and Franzoni, 2006; Cugno and Ottoz, 2006) suggest that 
compulsory licensing at low price associated with a long life for patent is socially optimal 
under rather weak conditions on demand and cost functions. But this result has been 
obtained for the case of numerous potential licensees, each with post-licensing costs 
equal to the patent holder ones. Considering firms with heterogeneous post-licensing 




A common argument against compulsory licensing of intellectual property maintains that 
it facilitates the entry of inefficient producers, which may reduce social welfare 
independently of any effects on R&D incentives. We have studied the issue in a model 
where the innovative firm chooses between quantity and price competition, showing that 
in this case compulsory licensing threat might work as a disciplining device to improve 
static social welfare, even when the applicant is a high cost inefficient firm. 
By compulsory licensing threat we mean a two step policy where the requirement of 
compulsory licensing is preceded by a formal warning that antitrust authority is 
determined to intervene after a given time, if the patent holder refuses to grant access to 
the essential facility. Our main result is that, provided the license entails a royalty per unit 
of output and no fixed fee, the above policy is welfare enhancing in the short run for any 
significant combination of parameters. The rationale behind this result lies in the fact that 
the patent holder under the threat of compulsory licensing reacts in a welfare enhancing 
way. In case of inefficient potential licensees, giving rise to the static inefficiency 
problem, the preferred strategy by the patent holder is to lower output price so as to deter 
the potential entrant from applying for a license. On the other hand compulsory licensing 
is the preferred choice when potential licensees present a small cost disadvantage with the 
patent holder, as in that case the exclusionary strategy would be too expensive.  
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